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MODERN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
AND WEB 2.0 IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACIES
Petros Iosiﬁdis and Mark Wheeler
During the ﬁrst two decades of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the social media has facilitated inter-
active communications between the political elites and public. In the 2016 UK Referendum,
the social media became a vehicle for contested political arguments and post-truth positions
deﬁned the Remain and Leave camps. For instance, it was claimed that the United Kingdom
Independence Party former leader Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant tweets inﬂuenced many
voters. In the 2016 US Presidential election, the victorious celebrity property tycoon
Donald Trump maintained a controversial online presence. He posted tweets about his cam-
paign and engaged in a blatantly hateful online discourse aimed at his political opponents.
Therefore, does such a usage of the social media aid democratic representation or contribute
to a greater destabilisation of modern politics?
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Introduction
During ﬁrst two decades of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the Internet emerged from being
an add-on to the television-based campaigns in western liberal democracies to becoming
an essential component within the wider communication of politics. In some respects, the
traditional forms of political advertising and alternative forms of elite-public relations have
created more plural relations with the electorate through the employment of party web-
sites, candidate blogs and the incorporation of social networks such as Facebook,
You Tube and Twitter. However, the social media platforms have been seen to more signiﬁ-
cantly reconﬁgure interactive communications between apparently “anti-establishment”
capitalist interests and the public to establish new forms of participation.
This article will consider how politicians have employed the social media to affect
major changes in recent US Presidential campaigns and the European Union (EU) Referen-
dum. It will employ Chadwick’s concept of the “hybrid media system” to consider how the
social media has been incorporated into mainstream political communication strategies.
“The hybrid media system is built upon interactions among older and new media logics
– where logics are deﬁned as technologies, genres norms, behaviours and organisational
forms – in the reﬂexively connected ﬁelds of media and politics” (Chadwick 2013, 12).
Such hybridity is reﬂective of the fragmentation of the media audience; the dissol-
ution of centralised party systems; grassroots political activity; the rise of generic 24/7
news channels and citizen journalism; the global consumption of infotainment and a
greater ﬂuidity within political ideologies, presentation and marketing (Chadwick 2013, 12).
In this respect, the US Democratic Presidential candidacies of Howard Dean in 2004
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and Barack Obama in 2008/2012 proved to be “game-changers” in shaping the political
employment of the social media. While Dean showed how the web could announce his can-
didacy, Obama demonstrated how to “run an Internet campaign that [used] all the relevant
media, most notably television, to blend centralisation, control and hierarchy with decentra-
lisation, devolution, and horizontality” (Chadwick 2013, 209).
Most recently, the Republican Presidential victor Donald Trump utilised the social
media to reach out a disaffected electoral base to win the 2016 Presidential election
against Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton. The highly controversial Trump, who had
established his media capital as a property tycoon and television celebrity on The Apprentice
(2004 onwards), developed his online presence through Twitter, where he has regularly
posted comments about his campaign, other candidates, political views and the “rigged”
mainstream media coverage. Trump was notorious for his negative, aggressive and some-
times blatantly hateful tweets, in which he routinely calls his opponents, political and other-
wise, “losers” and “haters.” For many, the Trump campaign was accompanied by the rise of
“fake news” via close advisor Steve Bannon’s online Breitbart News, information provoca-
teurs and “post-truth” politics.
In tandem, the EU Referendum which led to the Brexit decision in 2016 was
accompanied by the populist online narrative. The social media echo-chamber tended to
reinforce the anti-European rhetoric within the mainstream media led by a chorus of
Brexit-led newspapers and Leave campaigners. Across the social media, anti-immigrant sen-
timent was fuelled by the view that dysfunctional European elite was bent on undermining
Britain’s economy, sovereignty and self-conﬁdence. This led to the xenophobic falsehoods
claiming that a Vote Leave outcome would Canute-like turn back the “waves” of immigrants
who were ready to pounce from Eastern Europe and the Syrian refugee crisis.
Therefore, have the modern examples of the deployment of the social media within
political campaigns-aided democratic forms of political representation or have they contrib-
uted to a greater destabilisation of modern politics? Moreover, have the new communi-
cations techniques overcome the perception of a democratic deﬁcit or have they
contributed to a greater sense alienation and distrust in the political process?
US Presidential Elections – the Internet from the Periphery to the Centre of
Campaign Operations
Throughout the early Internet campaigns within the 1990s and 2000s, the social
media was seen as a supplementary medium to television. Invariably, Presidential candi-
dates continued to plough their resources into traditional spot adverts and the buying
up of air-time. However, this attitude changed when the little-known Governor of
Vermont Howard Dean ran for the Presidential nomination in the 2004 Democratic Pri-
maries. Dean not only used the Internet for funding drives and campaign communications
but to open up the way for a “citizen-initiated” approach (Gibson 2010, 7). In turn, Barack
Obama would take signiﬁcant advantage of the social media while continuing to employ
the political communications principles drawn from the television age (Chadwick
2013, 199).
In 2008, a signiﬁcant change in political campaign management occurred as Obama
realised that the social media could facilitate a “shift… toward a looser ‘hybrid’ mode of
operation that incorporated the network tactics of protest movements” (Gibson 2010, 5).
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The Obama campaign established the MyBo site which after a straightforward registration
process offered users with a wide degree of involvement in an online political community. It
encouraged recruitment drives and enabled local associations, invariably drawn from youth
groups, college students and non-traditional political actors to organise as grassroots acti-
vists, thereby working in an inclusive and relational manner (Bang 2009, 132).
Therefore, across the battleground states, Obama’s utilisation of social networking
technologies enabled his campaign organisation to swell to 1.5 million community
organisers. To aid their door-to-door canvassing, volunteers accessed constantly
updated databases through ﬁeld ofﬁces and via MyBo concerning information about
potential voters’ political leanings (Lai Stirland 2008). This blend of volunteering,
gumshoe canvassing and information processing became the hallmark of the Obama
campaign as it built, tweaked and tinkered “with its technology and organisational infra-
structure… to successfully integrate technology with a revamped model of political
organisation that stresses volunteer participation and feedback on a massive scale”
(Lai Stirland 2008).
Through these inclusive techniques, Obama remained in constant touch with his core
support and attracted online activists. He deﬁned a political image founded on reciprocity
to encourage the popular scrutiny of his ideas. Obama’s social media campaign represented
more than just “Obama as a candidate” but enabled him to galvanise a social movement
mobilised by “Obama as a cause” (Heilemann and Halperin 2010, 52). Throughout the
2008 and 2012 campaigns, Obama’s approach demonstrated how Internet had reconﬁ-
gured the nature of political marketing:
What resulted was not only a victory for the Democrats and Obama, but also the legacy of
what was widely regarded as one of the most effective Internet marketing plans in history
– where social media and technology enabled the individual to activate and participate in
a movement. (Chang 2008, 2)
Donald Trump – Voice and Output: Political Outsider, Outrage and
Charismatic Authority in 140 Characters
While in many respects, Obama and Trump were the polar opposites of one another,
Trump’s 2016 campaign built upon Obama’s online presence by re-conﬁguring notions of
reciprocity and reaching out to an electoral base via the social media. Further hybridity
occurred between Trump’s media stardom, his construction of a social movement and
his utilisation of charismatic demagoguery across the Internet. Like other twenty-ﬁrst
century political candidates, Trump maintained a presence across social media platforms.
He used many obvious techniques (direct address, polling audience, posting pictures
with his family and behind the scenes information). However, Trump’s most notable
online contributions occurred via Twitter, where he posted comments on a daily basis
about his right-wing political views, the success of his campaign and the “unfair” coverage
he received in the mainstream media.
Trump’s Twitter handle itself – @realDonaldTrump – directly communicated the idea
that the content he presented was genuine and unﬁltered so he could speak to a broader
social movement. He used Twitter to point out the alleged fakery of others to position him
as an honest, plain-spoken, unﬁltered foil, whose brash sincerity and unapologetic vehe-
mence stood as a pillar of his brand. Twitter enabled Trump to provide a public voice
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with an increasingly disaffected public when he claimed he would “drain the swamp”within
the Washington beltway.
As an outsider “businessman” Trump rallied against the elites and special interests,
while maximising his own personal and ﬁnancial attributes to build up reciprocal relations
with his online audiences who enjoyed his reactionary populism. Consequently, it was
Trump the maverick billionaire capitalist, who had never stood for any other political
ofﬁce, that managed to present himself as the “anti-establishment” candidate by blackening
his media critics, Republican Party Primary opponents such as Senators Ted Cruz and Marco
Rubio, and ultimately the Democratic Presidential nominee – “Crooked” Hilary Clinton.
Therefore, through such “authenticity” he established a deep and rooted connection with
the rust-belt electorate who felt they had been ignored and betrayed by the political and
media establishments.
He used his hybrid media/digital presence to enhance his personal brand, which had
been created via the tropes of Reality TV, Gossip Columns and Talk Radio to establish a form
of political capital with the American public. Trump provided an expression of celebrity lea-
dership via the interface of social media platforms with his outrageous media performances
throughout the primary and election debates, alongside campaign rallies where he rallied
his supporters that he would imprison Clinton. He successfully propelled his candidacy
through a purposefully controversial social media performance in which he engaged in
an outlandish and hateful commentary. In such a manner, he constructed a deliberate
and contradictory news agenda, which demonstrated that:
The only thing that’s really changed between Trump’s other attempts to run for ofﬁce and
now is the advent of social media. And Trump, who has spent his life offending people,
knows exactly how to bend it to his will.… The more the TV shows talk about him, the
more we all talk about him. If you want to truly comprehend why Trump is so popular,
you just have to behold what people are saying in 140 characters. (http://www.
vanityfair.com/news/2016/04/how-silicon-valley-created-donald-trump)
An early example of Trump’s outrageous Twitter “performance” was evident when he
engaged in a sexist and derogatory attack upon the ex-Fox New Presenter and GOP (Grand
Old Party) primary debate moderator Megyn Keller. Previously, she had the temerity of
being critical of his political grandstanding, so Trump tweeted, and “I refuse to call
Megyn Kelly a bimbo, because that would not be politically correct. Instead I will only
call her a lightweight reporter!” (http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/history-donald-trump-
megyn-kelly-feud/story?id=36526503).
Throughout the 2016 President campaign, Trump mastered Twitter unlike any other
presidential candidate before him by unleashing its power to be a tool of political pro-
motion, distraction, score-settling and attack. In the process, he fulﬁlled the fantasies of
those social media avatars who had predicted a White House candidacy that would
replace the expensive conventions of political communication with a campaign, which
emphasised the urgent and visceral nature of the social media. As Trump has shown,
within online modern political campaigns there has been a recurring focus on an
imagery that gives “voice” to the irrational and projects an ego who seeks constant
attention:
If we’re talking about them, [he is] winning the war for attention. No one knows this better
than Trump. Prod the social-media tiger, you get attention: say Mexicans are rapists, make
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fun of the disabled, pick a ﬁght with the Pope, attack women, call the media dumb, and
social media shines a big, bright spotlight on Donald. (http://www.vanityfair.com/news/
2016/04/how-silicon-valley-created-donald-trump)
EU and Brexit: Fake News on the Social Media
Donald Trump’s victory was welcomed by the variety of new, populist right-wing pol-
itical parties across Europe. These parties have spread a form of populist nationalism which
has placed pressure upon the project of the EU which was designed to promote democracy,
freedom, peace and economic reconstruction. During her failed bid to become French Pre-
sident, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front political party, promised that she
would pull France out of the Euro and hold a “Frexit” referendum on membership of the
EU. She told CNN in an interview that Trump’s victory is “a sign of hope for those who
cannot bear wild globalisation” (http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/15/politics/marine-le-
pen-interview-donald-trump/). Similar to Le Pen, like-minded Hungarian Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán has heralded Trump’s election victory as the end of “liberal non-democracy”
(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/donald-trump-us-election-win-hunga
rian-prime-minister-viktor-orban-end-liberal-non-democracy-a7413236.html).
The biggest upset to the EU project occurred on 23 June 2016 when the British people
decided in a referendum to leave the EU by almost 52–48 per cent. The vote for Brexit has
been well-documented and several explanations have been put forth, though two factors
mattered the most: immigration and sovereignty, both representing a desire for people
to take back control of their own lives and the feeling that they are unrepresented by poli-
ticians. These ideas signify fear and alienation and represented a retreat back towards
nationalism and borders. The media inﬂuenced the referendum result as the reporting of
immigration particularly in the tabloid press was extremely negative well before the cam-
paign began, with a steady stream of stories about immigrants “sponging” off the
welfare state, “bleeding the National Health Service dry and being involved in criminality”
(http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-1-context/under
standing-the-role-of-the-mass-media-in-the-eu-referendum/).
But it was not only the mainstream media that played a role in the decision to leave
the EU. In fact, the EU referendum can be dubbed as the ﬁrst “digital referendum” because
both the ofﬁcial Leave (‘Vote Leave’) and Remain (‘Britain Stronger in Europe’) campaigns
utilised key aspects of the successful Obama model developed during the 2008 and 2012
US Presidential Elections. In an effort to identify and then mobilise their respective followers,
the two opposite campaigns used big data mining, data analysis, micro-targeting and social
media for intelligence gathering purposes to construct detailed and personalised voter
proﬁles.
The Internet and social media were heavily used for getting their messages across the
electorate, though the Leave campaign was much more successful at targeting than the
Remain campaign eventually resulting in victory (http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-
referendum-analysis-2016/section-7-social-media/leave-versus-remain-the-digital-battle/).
A large-scale social media data analysis demonstrates that not only did Brexit supporters
have a more powerful and emotional message, but they were also more effective in the
use of social media like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. A combination of factors, such
as the more intuitive and straightforward messaging by the Leave campaign (which is
crucial for social media campaigning) and the highly emotionally charged nature of
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messages (which facilitated the viral spread of Leave ideas) led to the activation of a greater
number of Leave followers at grassroots level, something that eventually inﬂuenced
many undecided voters (http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/
section-7-social-media/impact-of-social-media-on-the-outcome-of-the-eu-referendum/).
So the EU referendum showed that social media tools can be used to shape the public
agenda, form public opinion and drive social change – for better or for worse. In parallel
with Trump’s sensational victory, the vote for Brexit was secured in what has been
dubbed the era of “post-truth politics” largely based on fake news, the misuse of statistics
and appeals to emotion rather than policies and facts. In this capacity, hybrid media and
online discourses constructed a potent “politics of fear” which impacted on the UK electo-
rate’s political thinking. It may yet prove a costly game for the British people and the rest of
the EU citizens. One worrying trend in the new world is that stretching the truth can be seen
as just part of a game. European leaders are struggling to absorb the impact of Internet-
spread fake news on balloting around the world as the continent faces a series of elections
during 2017 that will reshape its future. Post-truth in politics is one of the drivers of popu-
lism and it is one of the threats to democracy.
Most especially, the prominent Leave campaigner, ex-Mayor of London and Conser-
vative Cabinet member Boris Johnson’s cavalier attitude to the truth received a signiﬁcant
hearing throughout the news and social media during the EU Referendum Campaign.
Jonathan Freedland compared Johnson with Trump by declaring him to be a “post-truth”
politician:
Johnson reminded us that he has more in common with Trump than just a lovingly styled,
idiosyncratic head of blond hair.…On BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, Johnson reminded
listeners how slippery his grasp on the truth has long been.… As with Trump, humour plays
a crucial part.… Too often, radio and TV interviewers want to appear in on the joke, to share
in the chuckle… But it’s clear why this matters… (as)… how can we have a functioning
democracy when we cannot agree on the most basic facts? (http://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2016/may/13/boris-johnson-donald-trump-post-truth-politician)
By engaging in a race to the bottom, Johnson’s unreliable political discourse (along
with that of the UK Independence Party – UKIP – former leader Nigel Farage) meant that
his arguments concerning the EU debate were distorted around immigration. Therefore,
Johnson’s wilful irresponsibility (with Michael Gove, Chris Grayling, Ian Duncan Smith,
John Mann and Frank Field) was a contributory factor to the “ugliness” that surrounded
the national conversation about the referendum.
Farage, a right-wing populist and anti-European Parliament politician who had a key
role in the Brexit plebiscite, played a nationalist card by depicting hordes of Middle Eastern
immigrants ready to land in the UK in campaign posters. His infamous “Breaking Point”
poster can be described as a “fake” since it showed a queue of migrants at the Croatia-Slo-
venia border, trying to get into Britain. Johnson and Gove, leaders of the Vote Leave cam-
paign, also played the immigration card and delivered fake news as one of its posters
claimed: “Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU” and Penny Mordaunt, a
Defence Minister, claimed the Government would not be able to stop Turkish criminals
entering the UK or to veto Turkey’s EU accession (the latter a downright lie).The ultimate
piece of fake news was the claim that leaving would provide a £350m-a-week bonus for
the NHS from the UK’s contribution to EU coffers (http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/
michael-gove-boris-johnson-brexit-eurosceptic-press-theresa-may-a7533806.html).
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Anticipating/echoing Trump, another main slogan of the Brexiteers, was “we want our
country back.” But given that Parliamentary scrutiny for Theresa May’s Brexit strategy is
strictly limited in the post-Referendum era, the irony is that Brexit is not restoring the sover-
eignty of the UK Parliament. As for the journalists who forecast long-term severe economic
consequences for a post-Brexit UK economy (in particular, fall in the pound and higher
inﬂation), these are criticised by Brexiteers as “unpatriotic” who write “hyped up media
reports,” quite similar to Trump’s “fake news” attack.
Conclusion
US Presidential candidates initially treated the Internet with circumspection as they
remained unconvinced about whether there could be a greater outreach to the electorate.
However, as the Internet rapidly expanded, the new communications formats of the social
media offered the politicians with greater opportunities to reconﬁgure their campaign strat-
egies. Obama was to realise the full worth of these campaign strategies in 2008. He
employed a hybrid media approach in which he used more traditional forms of image man-
agement, along with a communitarian-inspired approach to the social media to affect a pol-
itical movement. Through Obama’s intricate machine of a network of volunteers, he won
key states in the Democratic Primaries from the front-runner Senator Hillary Clinton and
in the General Election against his opponent Republican Senator John McCain.
Clinton faced another new social media form of political communication when she
was pitched against Donald Trump in 2016. Trump had enjoyed national name recognition
and bullish reputation since the 1980s thanks to his business empire, which includes real
estate, casinos, resorts and golf courses, books, and beauty pageants. In the 2010s,
Trump had become a brand and he stridently developed his populist celebrity by question-
ing the legitimacy of Obama’s birth rights to rule as US President. Therefore, he used his
celebrity capital as a base to change the parameters of social media campaigning with
his negative, aggressive and hateful employment of Twitter which reﬂect his para-social
relationship with the American public. By lashing out at his political opponents and using
cruel humour, he positioned himself as the anti-establishment candidate who regularly
tweeted his contempt of the political elite to directly speak and activate a disaffected elec-
toral base. In his ﬁrst year of ofﬁce, Trump has continued to employ Twitter to denigrate his
opponents, to rail against the “fake news” agenda while using the social media to engage
within it, and to deﬂect attention away from his own political failings.
In the UK, the EU Referendum and in particular the Leave Campaign that was master-
minded by political leaders Boris Johnson and Michael Gove’s precipitous excess in
distorting truths, delivering notions of sovereignty and patriotism that veiled a strain of
xenophobia, and spreading negative views against immigrants through social media
proved effective for mobilising the majority. In its 2016 report, the House of Commons
Treasury Select Committee noted that “the public debate is being poorly served by incon-
sistent, unqualiﬁed and, in some cases, misleading claims and counter-claims.” It is then
hard to argue that the EU Referendum, characterised by falsehoods and fairy tales dissemi-
nated by social media, actually beneﬁted the British democratic system.
Trump, along with the Brexiteers, became the ultimate manifestation of “voice” and
“output.” Here it is contended that virtuous civic duties are being replaced by alternative
forms of engagement and participation in which the outcomes may play out to public
prejudice. John Keane (2009) maintains that a “Monitory Democracy,” in which
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consumer-led representations have become the measurement of accountability. Most
especially, the social media contains both opportunities for pluralism and the manifestation
of public obedience to re-conﬁgured elites who proclaim to represent the dispossessed.
Trump’s Twitter strategy explicitly enhanced his charismatic authority which, as outlined
by Max Weber, rests on the individual’s ability to continuously “prove” his legitimacy, deter-
mination and strength; when he does so, followers are compelled to “faithfully surrender” to
him (Weber [1946] 1998, 78). In tandem, reading the EU Referendum campaign in terms of
some of the personalities involved suggests that key ﬁgures such as Farage positioned
himself as outsider to elite political institutions, thereby aligning himself (like Trump)
with the disenfranchised masses, while Johnson’s political opportunism and desire for indi-
vidual political power led to an emotionally charged campaign and eventually incoherent
exit strategy.
This means that these types of engagement with social media are highly questionable
in preserving political consensus and have exposed the ﬁssures in modern democracies.
Therefore, from these examples, a mixed picture has occurred with regard to the usage
of online techniques in representative democracies and there are still many questions
about whether they actually encourage a greater form of public efﬁcacy. Most observers
today concur that especially in regard to social media, modern communication technol-
ogies have impacted profoundly on politics and participation. But the problem is that
there is still no overarching agreement in terms of how and to what extent this impact
takes place, and what signiﬁcance it has for democratic politics (Iosiﬁdis and Wheeler
2016). In the cases of Trump’s Twitter strategy both in his campaign (and within the early
period of his Presidency) and the use of social media by Brexiteers, it is clear that the
social media engagement has been highly controversial in relation to democratic deﬁcits
and that the usage of online techniques has left open questions as to whether democratic
consensus can be achieved.
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